“Am I Not Pious?”:

An Examination of the Idea of the King in the Tannaitic and Hellenistic Periods

“Thus spoke David before the Holy One, Blessed Be He: Am I not pious? As all of the kings of the East and the West sleep until the third hour, while I ‘At Midnight I rise to give thanks to thee’ (Psalms 119:62)’… Am I not pious, for all of the kings of the East and the West convene and think of nothing but their honor, while my hands are soiled with blood, amniotic fluid, and afterbirth to render a woman ritually pure. Furthermore, for every ruling I issue, I consult with my teacher, Mephibosheth… “Did I rule properly? Did I convict properly? Did I acquit properly? Did I rule ritually pure properly? Did I rule ritually impure properly?” And I was not embarrassed”

-         Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 4a

A: Εἰκὼν Βασιλική: The Strength of Hellenistic Kingship

Kingship demands nothing less than a total spiritual and mental commitment from its subjects to survive. Other regimes can survive on their practical merits without convincing the entire population of the inherent goodness of the system and those leading it. They might deliberately even set up ways and institutions to question and challenge both. Kingship, however, requires total devotion to perpetuate itself on its own terms.

Hellenistic Kingship was unique in that it borrowed from two competing monarchist traditions: The pragmatic Macedonian court of the 4th century BC, and the ancient, ritualistic states of the East.

The Hellenistic kingdoms in the East were far from being backward “Kafiristan” where, like in Kipling's famous short story, a simple sergeant could become a god due to the local superstition and credulity. Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor were all highly developed societies before the Macedonian conquest, active parts in the complicated, mercurial international world called “The Persian Empire”. After the conquest, the entire intellectual prowess of the Hellenic world shifts eastward to places like Alexandria and Antioch due to royal patronage of philosophy, the sciences, and the arts.

Thus, these kingdoms required, and had, a philosophical idealization of their monarchial institutions, creating a State with a strong hold on the minds of its subjects, drawing legitimacy from pragmatic politics, religion, and ideology.

B: Divus: The Principles and Spread of Hellenistic Monarchism

The best example of the spread of the Hellenistic model of monarchy is the Roman Principate.  In truth, while the Principes attempted to stress the differences between themselves and the (now extinct) Hellenistic kings of the East, the Principate wouldn’t be unrecognizable to the subjects of, let’s say, Ptolemy I Soter or Antiochus II Theos.  A Republic-in-Name is being presided over by a man praised for his unique virtues and quietly (or not so quietly) talked about as “Divus” – that is, having a Divine quality, if not being a true god on Earth.

Hellenistic Kingship was informed by Platonic philosophy, which saw the Divine as the Human idealized, and therefore, there was no contradiction between the normal human behavior of the King and his semi-divine nature: The King was not defined as “Divus” due to his inhumanity but, on the contrary, by his supposed supernatural excellence in all human fields and pursuits – he was the best citizen, jurist, orator and general; the best friend, companion, paterfamilias, businessman and priest. It was only in death that the human mask, supposedly, was revealed to his courtiers that he with whom they drank, hunted, passed judgment, and administered the Empire has been, all along, one of the gods whose company he now rejoined.

The virtues, or rather, the gifts (Χαρίσματα) expected of the King, or attributed to him, were similar to those of the anthropomorphic Hellenic gods: The gods were Μακάριοί, that is, they enjoyed perfect happiness by their very nature, without need for outside input; thus the King was similarly self-sufficient in his power and wealth, which flowed from his person like the rays of the Sun. Thus, the king was not crowned by his subjects or elevated by their support to his office – on the contrary, he was “revealed” to them (επιφανέν) in his royal, semi-divine nature, which one could, or would, resist only out of madness (Μανία) or wickedness (Πονηρία), the two main bugbears of post-Socratic philosophy.

But let us not think that the King’s divine nature meant that he could be flippant toward the gods; on the contrary,  the King supposedly possessed the greatest (ευσέβειά) since his nature granted him the most profound understanding of their nature and the greatest kinship with them.

As a divine figure, the King had the best άρετέ, or excellence in everything that makes one manly and worthy for public office – he was the greatest justice, bravery, and, most importantly, magnanimity (μεγαλοψυχία) and beneficence, which is the reason he was the greatest benefactor (Εὐεργέτης) of his state, which was not confined to a single city but could, theoretically and ideally, encompass the entire world. Thus, his subjects were true citizens of the entire earth and countrymen to the entire (civilized) human race.   

All these elements contributed to making the Hellenistic Kingship the ideal regime for the Empire, and one specifically designed to ease the transition from a republican to a monarchic form of government. However, what is surprising is not the adaptation of this model and its improvement by the Romans, but by small states doing the same. From Asia Minor to Bactria, as the Seleucid declined, new states and principalities emerged, each of them adopting a version of Hellenistic monarchy.

Let us now consider, as a case in point, one such monarchy, rising out of a Revolution against this very model only to, through great challenges and popular resistance, adopt it themselves, only for the founding dynasty to be destroyed by it and lead to the ultimate destruction of its state.

C: The Maccabean Revolution and the Hassidians’ Republic

The Maccabean Revolution, starting c. 167 BC, had culminated in 150 BC in a treaty between Jonathan Apphus, the High Priest and Στρατηγός of the Jews, and Alexander Balas, a contender to the Seleucid throne, recognizing Jewish independence and the position of Jonathan as their official and legitimate leader and representative.

While we cannot talk with confidence about the nature of the Jewish government at the time of Jonathan, we know what form it will take in the administration of his nephew, John Hyrcanus I:

A coin from that time bears the Hebrew inscription:

יוחנן הכהן הגדול וחבר היהודים

“John, the High Priest and the ‘Heber’ of the Jews”

Heber - חבר) Literally: “bond” or “collective”), could either refer to a representative body or the body of the citizenry. In either case, John didn’t rule alone. We are further aware, from the writings of Josephus, that the People were active participants in politics.

How the People were able to enforce their power in politics is evident from how they did so when John Hyrcanus’ son, Jonathan Alexander Jannaeus, wished to ignore them – namely, by armed revolt.

The Hasmonean State was born in a popular uprising and, at least for the first three generations, sustained itself by supporting the national army, whose main body was the military settlers of Galilee. Hasmonean leaders ignored the People at their peril. Seth Schwartz notes[1] there was no true Demos of Jerusalem – instead, the entire Jewish people were considered Jerusalemites, and Jerusalem was considered the metropolis of the whole of the Jewish people – a fact that is very logical if we consider the circumstances and ideology of the Maccabean Revolution – a countryside revolt that swept the capital and its collaborationist elite. Therefore, there were only two convenient options for the People to meet and deliver decisions to the Hasmonean leaders – either as an army in the field addressing their commander in chief – (the Nassi) or in the great triennial pilgrimages, addressing the Hasmonean leader will be addressed in his function as high priest.

We thus find various early Hasmoneans interacting with the People assembled as a political force – Simon Thassi in encouraging the people to take courage after the murder of his brother Jonathan, and what amounted to the signing of a constitution:

“The eighteenth day of the month of Elul, in the hundred threescore and twelfth year,

Being the third year of Simon the high priest, At Jerusalem (alt. Carmel?) in the great congregation of the priests, and people, and rulers of the nation, and elders of the country, were these things notified unto us.

Forasmuch as oftentimes there have been wars in the country,

wherein for the maintenance of their sanctuary, and the law, Simon the son of Mattathias, of the posterity of Jarib, together with his brethren, put themselves in jeopardy, and resisting the enemies of their nation did their nation great honor:

After that Jonathan, having gathered his nation together, and been their high priest, was added to his people, their enemies prepared to invade their country, that they might destroy it, and lay hands on the sanctuary:

At which time Simon rose, and fought for his nation, spent much of his own substance, armed the valiant men of his nation, and gave them wages,

And fortified the cities of Judea, together with Beth-Tsura, that lieth upon the borders of Judea, where the armor of the enemies had been before; but he set a garrison of Jews there:

Moreover, he fortified Japho, which lieth upon the sea, and Gazera, which borders upon Azotus, where the enemies had dwelt before: but he placed Jews there and furnished them with all things convenient for the reparation thereof.

The people, therefore, sang the acts of Simon, and unto what glory he thought to bring his nation, made him their governor and chief priest, because he had done all these things, and for the justice and faith which he kept to his nation, and for that he sought by all means to exalt his people.

For in his time things prospered in his hands, so that the heathen were taken out of their country, and they also that were in the city of David in Jerusalem, who had made themselves a tower, out of which they issued, and polluted all about the sanctuary, and did much hurt in the holy place:

But he placed Jews therein. And fortified it for the safety of the country and the city and raised the walls of Jerusalem.

King Demetrius also confirmed him in the high priesthood according to those things and made him one of his friends, and honored him with great honor.

For he had heard say, that the Romans had called the Jews their friends and confederates and brethren; and that they had entertained the ambassadors of Simon honorably;

Also that the Jews and priests were well pleased that Simon should be their governor and high priest forever until there should arise a faithful prophet;

Moreover that he should be their captain, and should take charge of the sanctuary, to set them over their works, and over the country, and over the armor, and over the fortresses, that, I say, he should take charge of the sanctuary;

Beside this, that he should be obeyed by every man, and that all the writings in the country should be made in his name, and that he should be clothed in purple, and wear gold:

Also it should be lawful for none of the people or priests to break any of these things, or to gainsay his words, or to gather an assembly in the country without him, or to be clothed in purple, or wear a buckle of gold;

And whosoever should do otherwise, or break any of these things, he should be punished.”

So they commanded that this writing should be put in tables of brass and that they should be set up within the compass of the sanctuary in a conspicuous place. Also, that the copies thereof should be laid up in the treasury, to the end that Simon and his sons might have them.

                                                (1st Maccabees, 14:29-52)

 

This a thoroughly republican document, that could have been issued by any Hellenistic or classical Greek polis – the People, assembled with the aristocratic bodies as the presidium of their assembly, reward a successful general and statesman with various honors and positions. It effectively establishes Simon as a de-facto monarch, but it does so as a gift of the People to him – not an imposition by some innate authority he already possesses.

Another point of interest is the last line:

 “the copies thereof should be laid up in the treasury, to the end that Simon and his sons might have them.”

This suggests that wherever that Treasury was, Simon and his sons would have had unique access to it, and therefore the copies of this charter laid in it; considering that we know of no independent Hasmonean state treasury, it stands to reason that this is no other institution than the Temple’s Treasury – and as High Priest, Simon enjoyed a unique position in the managing of it.   

Thus, we have at least an idealized image of the Hasmonean Republic: It is led by a Nassi, who is both commander-in-chief and head of the Sanhedrin, and elected to this position by the People, assembled from all parts of the land (rather than just the capital), and presided over by the priests (as a corporate body) and the Elders (that is, the Sanhedrin). Together, they make up the Heber, the body politic of the Jews. The Nassi has always been the High Priest, but this is not a principle of the Constitution – the People could have just as easily chosen to keep these offices separate – albeit, the High Priest, as the person who controls the only treasury available to the use of the State, namely, that of the Temple, enjoys a great political advantage over any potential rival. The office of Nassi, in principle, is not necessarily a lifetime appointment – but Simon would enjoy such an appointment within his own lifetime as a special reward for his achievements.   

D: The Fragility of Ancient Democracies – The Dangers of Virtue Politics

1.     The Wave of Autocracy

This reminds us of another ancient republic that had found itself investing, semi-officially, a citizen in all the powers of a monarch – the late republic and early principate in Rome.

In truth, however, while the Caesars soon adapted to themselves all the attributes of Hellenistic kings, Alexander Jannaeus’ repeated attempts to do so were met with resistance that culminated in the First Jewish Civil War. While in Rome, the ascendancy of Caesar was the result of military force that overwhelmed the traditional institutions of the Republic, the gift of the Jews to Simon Thassi and John Hyrcanus I was genuine and uncompelled. When John’s son reneged on their side of the deal, they met fierce resistance that culminated in the effective collapse of the regime that was established by Simon Thassi.

But Rome and Judea were not unique. All over the Late Hellenistic Mediterranean, we find republics that adopt monarchical models that supersede but do not eliminate their democratic elements: Syracuse, Argos, Corinth, and even Athens saw themselves bowing to tyrants in the Hellenistic period. We can divide the causes of this phenomenon into two categories: external and internal.

2.     External Causes for Hellenistic Tyranny

Externally, Judea and the Greek Poleis share the suzerainty of the Hellenistic kingdoms, namely, the Seleucids and Macedon. The kings found it easier to deal with tyrannies and oligarchies, and their regimes were useful models to aspiring tyrants.

However, Rome and Judea established their monarchies at a time of military success—Judea had already achieved true independence, and Rome had been the greatest Mediterranean power for more than a century when the first dictator-for-life, Sulla, was appointed.

Another reason, which fits Judea and Rome but not the Greek states, is military pressure: Marius became incredibly powerful during the German and Numidian wars, Sulla had risen to power due to the Mithridatic and Civil Wars, and Pompey achieved effective imperial power, for some time, due to his war against the pirates. Caesar famously started the Gallic Wars and the Second Roman Civil War, which together dislodged Pompey from his position as the first man in Rome. Similarly, Simon Thassi and John Hyrcanus I both fought a string of difficult wars.

Outsized military challenges, whether defensive or aggressive in nature, lend commanders legitimacy that exceeds that of the traditional institutions of a republic. They put successful generals in the public eye and put civilian leadership into disrepute. It tempts the people to grant control over great resources and endow generals and politicians with extraordinary powers, which they can then turn against the Republic itself to secure personal power. In essence, the People’s patriotism and selfless sacrifices for the Republic lead to it being strangulated by selfish ambition.  

3.     The Paradoxical Flaw of Virtue Politics

However, this answer alone is unsatisfactory as an explanation to the rise of Simon Thassi – he did not seize power by cunningly abusing powers and resources granted to him in time of an emergency.

 If we wish to take the testimony of 1st Maccabees seriously, we must confront the possibility that free people would cheerfully and voluntarily give a popular commander extraordinary power in a lifetime appointment, not as a necessity but as a gift or a show of gratitude.

Therefore, we must investigate the inherent weakness of ancient republics: specifically, the theory of politics as the exercise of άρετέ, moral excellence, or, in other words, the dangers of virtue politics.

Platonic politics cited, as the ideal goal of the State, the nurturing of virtue in the citizenry.

Ideally, argues Plato in The Republic, the rulers should be those who exemplify the virtues that the state seeks to foster. Xenophon also made a similar argument in his description of the Spartan Constitution: the Spartans value military excellence above all other virtues, and therefore, not only is their constitution set to foster it amongst their citizens, but their leaders are exemplars of this form of excellence, and their decline had started only once they ceased “obeying their own laws”. In the following generation, Aristotle would claim that states go through forms of government in the same manner as organisms go through their life cycle, the transition point from one regime to the other being when the virtues typical of its rulers are corrupted into vices. Thus, tyranny is distinguishable from monarchy in the lack of virtue in the tyrant; an oligarchy differs from aristocracy only in the venality of the nobility; ochlocracy is a democracy where the people lack restraint.

                While it is practically impossible to make the leaders of the State uniformly virtuous, some people have better means to portray their supposed virtue and the vices of their opponents.

Furthermore, once a leader had claimed to himself sufficient public virtue, there is no limiting principle to the amount of power the People might entrust to him, nor is there a mechanism to revoke this trust if the leader in question fails to maintain his virtue. The Classical Greek philosophers had understood virtue to be a constant in a single person – Socrates is either an excellent soul or an inferior one. Both Plato and Aristotle understood the corruption of regimes to be an intergenerational process. It was not until Tacitus’ examination of the principate of Tiberius – or the Ηillel’s critique of John Hyrcanus I almost a century earlier – that the notion of a good ruler being corrupted over a long time in power comes to mind – even in the case of Critias, the assumption was that the rot was always there, and that his new position among the Thirty Tyrants merely allowed him an outlet to it.

4.     The Dangers of Oratory

Another vulnerability of ancient republics was their weakness for rhetorics – oratory was both law and politics, and there was little difference in the practice of the two.

Indeed, the idea that Law and politics should be separated at all was foreign to the Hellenistic period – if one is worthy to lead the Republic in war, to handle its treasure and to enforce its laws, surely one is to be trusted with the interpretation of the Law! The idea of dividing authorities between different bodies was widespread, but usually manifested in a way of creating parallels, breaks, or assigning different stages of the same process to different bodies.

Orators like Diogenes and his great admirer, Cicero, did not seek to prove to Athenian and Roman juries that their clients were in the legal right sensu stricto, but that they were useful and patriotic citizens and the benefactors of their communities. Similarly, whenever they were prosecuting someone, they made sure to explain that this prosecution will benefit the State. The argumentation of the facts was of a secondary concern – albeit the Roman orators have been less egregious offenders.

For instance, when Cicero seek the condemnation of Verres, he opens with a reason why it will beneficial to the State and to the Senate:

“That which was above all things to be desired, O judges, and which above all things was calculated to have the greatest influence towards allaying the unpopularity of your order, and putting an end to the discredit into which your judicial decisions have fallen, appears to have been thrown in your way, and given to you not by any human contrivance, but almost by the interposition of the gods, at a most important crisis of the republic. For an opinion has now become established, pernicious to us, and pernicious to the republic, which has been the common talk of everyone, not only at Rome, but among foreign nations also, —that in the courts of law as they exist at present, no wealthy man, however guilty he may be, can possibly be convicted.

And if you come to a decision about this man with severity and a due regard to your oaths, that authority which ought to remain in you will cling to you still; but if that man's vast riches shall break down the sanctity and honesty of the courts of justice, at least I shall achieve this, that it shall be plain that it was rather honest judgment that was wanting to the republic, than a criminal to the judges, or an accuser to the criminal.”

(Against Verres, I:1, I:3)

Diogenes, similarly, opens his speech against Mideias:

The brutality and insolence with which Meidias treats everyone alike are, I suppose, as well known to you, gentlemen of the jury, as to all other citizens…

...Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, I appeal to you all, and implore you first to grant me a favorable hearing, and secondly, if I prove that the insults of Meidias touch, not me only, but you and the laws and the whole body of citizens, to come at once to any rescue and to your own. For the case stands thus, Athenians. I was the victim, and it was my person that was then outraged; but now the question to be fought out and decided is whether Meidias is to be allowed to repeat his performances and insult anyone and everyone of you with impunity. 

There is no discussion of the Law, except for the one that authorizes the Court to handle this case. For the most part, both Diogenes and Cicero are trying to persuade the audience to arrive at their desirable verdict, not convince them of the correctness of their legal opinions.

In the hands of the Hellenistic Kings – and the Roman Principes – the abuse of this idea was all too easy. The King or the Emperor had merely to annex to his public character all virtue and arete, and the Law shall become his plaything. If propaganda can make him widely considered the very embodiment of virtue and the good of the State, then he himself shall become the Law. The tyrants of pre-classical Greece could have only envied such power – not to defy the Law, stand outside of it or even force its recreation by corruption of process – but to be the essence and font of the Law.

5.     The Paradox of Wealth in Hellenic Philosophy, Polis and Mercenary Culture

Finally, we come to the main weapon of ancient tyrannies: wealth.

Almost every ancient tyranny had established itself using not only fear, but wealth. While the first acts of brutality serve, so to speak, to clear the land and excavate the foundations, it is the desire for wealth by which the tyrant assembles to himself the stones of his future edifice, and it is by carefully and masterfully pouring this wealth that these discordant, unscrupulous and ambitious individuals as he uses are attached to each other around him.

The accumulation of capital was not an easy task in the ancient world, and the individuals the tyrant wishes to draw unto himself are likely to be relatively well-off to begin with – a paltry bribe will not suffice. What is required is the promise of such fabulous, unthinkable golden shower that even the richest man in a free republic cannot dream to acquire – in other words, it requires the acquisition of total control over the resources of the State and the removal of all the barriers which the Law and custom erected to prevent their transformation to private funds. Here is our first paradox: The acquisition of the State Treasury is required for the establishment of tyranny, but it requires tyrannical power to achieve.

The second paradox is that of respectability: while the tyrant can simply steal from the treasury and distribute his spoils to his friends, the inherent aura of criminality will haunt the regime and prevent it from creating a regulated, orderly system of distribution which alone can preserve the edifice across generations and beyond the tyrant's immediate circle. In other words, the tyrant must make the distribution of public treasure seems respectable and legal.

To answer these questions, we must recognize the great unifying fact of the Eastern Mediterranean: that is, the history of mercenary warfare, going back to the Bronze Age.

There was nothing unusual or scandalous in Xenophon's travel to serve in a Persian army in exchange for military compensation: Hellenic and Proto-Hellenic mercenaries have been serving eastern rulers at least since the late Bronze Age. Perhaps it was that phenomenon that cemented the East in the Greek mind as a place were extraordinary wealth can be found, in the form of gold and silver. In fact, the Persian King, the Great King, is portrayed in almost all classical literature, first and foremost, as exceedingly wealthy and overbearingly generous. It is not beyond him to distribute whole provinces at a time merely to provide funds, politely coded "bread" and "wine" for favored Greek exiles. In the Peloponnesian War, the greatest, most defining conflict of the Eastern Mediterranean, the role of the King is in supplying one side with funds and equipment for the war.

These facts both strengthen Greek notions of their own martial (and therefore, moral) superiority and embarrassed them:  Clearly the Persians had good reason to admire Greek manly excellence, or they would have not have spent so much wealth in diverting it from their own dominions or recruiting it to their own service – but how excellent can be the Greek if they are willing to divert their arms for a price?

Cephalus – Socrates' host the 1st book of the Republic – is both extremely wealthy and just, after his own understanding, in which wealth and justice are tied together ("to pay what I owe and to speak the truth") but he lacks civic excellence – he is not an Athenian, but a Syracusan who have left his home polis in order to accumulate wealth. It is no coincidence that the entire subsequent work is occupied with the construction of a State which shall guarantee its citizens the highest level of civic excellence – and thus, achieve true justice – and in which private wealth would not exist.

Even Xenophon's famous account of his travails as a mercenary reinforce the same idea – he represents to us how apprehensive his master Socrates was when he sought his advice for the adventure, and the entire narrative is nothing but a recounting of how the love of money brought the Ten Thousand to the brink of annihilation but how the excellence of their souls – that is, their ability to reason, to collaborate, to engage in military and civic enterprises in discipline and honor – saved them and restored them to their various Poleis. The "ascension" (Anabasis) is not merely geographic – it is a literal, inward ascension from the vice and ruin the love of foreign money brought upon the Greek camp unto their birthright of virtue, excellence and public lives – the true homelands of the soul.

Similar critiques of wealth – not its consequences, but the very desire to accumulate it – is present in Jewish and Roman literature in the period before their respective republics fell. The books of Ben Sira outright condemned the rich as such, and various sects which all but denounce any show of wealth. The Roman moralists famously considered the wealth of the provinces the bane of the Republic.

 E: The Corruption of the Maccabean Republic and the Fall of the Hasmonean Kingdom

The Hasmoneans, as we have seen, were invested with the high-priesthood, and thus, the control of the Temple Treasury. It was a common understanding that this treasure, after the need s of the Temple itself were met, was a legitimate source of all manner of public expenses – especially those relating to defense.

Until the last days of John Hyrcanus I’s reign, this situation was balanced by the army – which still was almost identical to the People. While the Hasmoneans were, no doubt, popular with the citizen-soldiery, their power was sufficient to empower the popular assembly and the Heber, their representatives. However, the clash between John Hyrcanus I and the Pharisees (that is, the spokesmen of the Law to the People and of the People and the Law in the councils of government) had set him on a collision course with the People themselves. The Hasmoneans, if they wished to leverage their existing position to acquire power which can resist the will of the People and of the Law as commonly interpreted required two things: a new source of legitimacy and an alternative military force to consummate their power.

Hyrcanus already found the first by adopting the Sadducees – formerly a marginal sect, whose main virtue was their belief in the primacy of the High Priest in interpreting the Law by oracle-like reading of the text. In other words, it empowered him to overrule any provision of the Law that may hinder his power. By this act, he turned his back not only on the People as a political body but on the synagogue: the locus of popular, public interpretation (Drash) by scholars who were not a separate class but merely the most learned members of the congregation – the Pharisees. Instead, the Sadducees established mystical circles headed by “True Teachers” (Morei BeTzedeq), the semi-mythical progenitor of whom was a priest named “Zadoq” (which may or may not be identified with the Zadok of Ezekiel 44). It was the repudiation of a republican model of Jewish life and Jewish scholarship in favor of a monarchic one- each Sadducee circle a small theological fief, and the High Priest-monarch at the head of them all.

But such authority, while it could be spread among a narrow circle of an elite, could not be imposed on the People without force. Thus, we find the next generation of Hasmoneans, the founders of the Kingship proper—that is, Judah Aristobulus I and Jonathan Alexander Jannaeus I—totally invested in the building of a foreign mercenary corps. Using the public treasury of the Temple, the hereditary presidents of the Republic had revoked the monopoly of violence that hitherto belonged to the People and the Law.

Therefore, the first Civil War between Jannaeus and the People should not be interpreted as a tragic accident. Still, as a conflict, Jannaeus was spoiling for and as his primary policy goal - to break the back of the People’s army with his new instrument of the Mercenary Corps. His near defeats, in and of by themselves, were immaterial. As long as he could get his hands back on the treasury, he could always hire more mercenaries while the people exhausted themselves in each phase of the conflict. The goal was to exhaust and bleed the old army and, with it, the last remnant of the Republic into submission.

When his wife, Salome Alexandra, ascended the throne, she was deprived of the wealth of the Temple since she could not, as a woman, serve as high priest; this fact alone is a sufficient explanation for her turn towards the popular Pharisees. Since she could not maintain her husband’s mercenaries, she had to tread carefully and appease the People. The next civil war was fought almost solely between two flanks of the Jewish army – the Pharisee-led supporters of John Hyrcanus II and the Sadducees-led adherents of Judah Aristobulus II.

Aristobulus was, during his mother’s reign, a partisan Sadducee leader – he cultivated what were essentially Sadducean militias and used them to take over fortresses on the border. But this partisanship was not principled – the Sadducees were out of power and were willing to support whoever would promise to return them to it. Aristobulus needed a path to the throne that bypassed the Law – which vaguely favored John Hyrcanus as the firstborn. After Aristobulus managed to oust his brother from power, he led no purge against the Pharisees, nor was he vindictive against his brother – he treated his rivals with magnanimity and pragmatism.

Similarly, John Hyrcanus II had no particular love for the Pharisees – they supported him since he was the firstborn and because the Sadducees supported Judah Aristobulus II. In truth, they were unhappy with the entire institution of kingship and wished to return to the Republic. They found themselves supporting a candidate to the throne due to the political reality of the conflict between the brothers. Many prominent Pharisees even refused to participate in it altogether, such as Honi the Circle Drawer. In the end, the issue was settled by Roman intervention.

This intervention had destroyed Judea as a viable state – it placed John Hyrcanus on the throne, but only under the supervision of Antipater the Idumean, an agent of Pompey Magnus, great districts were torn off and joined to neighboring Roman provinces.

The domination of Judea by a foreign power grated, especially on the former members of the Hasmonean army – if a mercenary corps employed by a Jewish King and High Priest was bad, foreign garrisons enforcing the general will of Rome and the particular policy of a Roman agent was unbearable. It is no wonder that when Antigonus II Mattathias, son of Aristobulus, had escaped captivity in Rome to Parthia and entered Judea from the east, the entire country rose up to his side – in particular the Pharisees, to whom Antigonus appealed in order to bring the old Hasmonean army to his side. This attempted liberation was doomed from the start due to the imbalance between Atigonus II’s forces and those of Rome and the fact that Rome could not allow a Parthian-supported prince to establish himself between Syria and Egypt – but nevertheless, this was sufficient to engender a Hasmonean nostalgia among Pharisee circles  - especially as the reign of Herod and his successors proved to be a nightmare.  

Conclusion: Blood and Afterbirth: David as an Anti-King

 The Great Revolt was a revolt not only against Rome but also against a century of monarchy – whether embodied by the Herodians, Hasmoneans, or the Roman procurator. The government of the Revolt was a republican one, with a moderate Sanhedrin resuming its role as the governing council as it was in the days of John Hyrcanus I. This government failed – not only to stand against Rome but also to maintain itself against Sicarii and other mutineers. In its aftermath, the Sages attempted to reconstruct a model of government – whether republican or monarchic – that would not suffer from the same flaws.

David of the Midrash we brought at the beginning of our discussion – the David that spends his life in the study of the Law and prayer, and in the dissemination of the Law, but leaves all actual government decisions from economy to warfare to “the Sages of Israel” is a line-by-line rejection of Hellenistic kingship:  The king is not the source of wealth, nor is he a conquering demigod, or the font of the Law. He is the giver of good advice and an exemplar of Eusebia – but his Eusebia is a humble one, of a devotee of God who is utterly unconvinced in his own righteousness and requires God’s affirmation of his status as a Hasid. He is a scholar but also a student who humbles himself in front of a master. He is concerned with his duties as an arbitrator of the Law but is not the font of the Law.

The Sages gave us here a vision of Republican kingship – the king as a servant of the Republic and its anchor, not its master.

[1] Schwartz, S; “Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society?” PP 91-92, footnote 32, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 2010